Background/objective How the public behave following a nuclear emergency will help to determine overall levels of morbidity and mortality. Pre-event education might help to shape behaviour, but how best to engage people with emergency communications for low likelihood, high impact events is unknown. We conducted a systematic review to identify factors which predict behaviour in preparation for a nuclear incident; factors which predict behaviour in the immediate aftermath of a nuclear incident; and preferences among members of the public for information designed to educate them about actions to take in the event of a nuclear incident.
Introduction
Recent advances in the capability and willingness of terrorists and state actors to use unconventional weapons 1 have raised the spectre of catastrophic attacks against civilian populations. The potential for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons to generate large numbers of casualties, economic harm and widespread fear unfortunately acts as an incentive 1, 2 and reports exist of terrorist groups trying to acquire radiological capability 3 and operating weapon development facilities. 4 Radiological and nuclear incidents are perhaps the most alarming to the public and emergency planners alike. Catastrophic terrorist attacks, including use of a nuclear device, were identified as amongst the highest priority risks in the 2015 UK National Risk Register 5 and as having the highest impact severity in the 2017 edition, with civil emergencies such as nuclear power plant (NPP) leaks also figuring highly. 6 If such events happen, public reactions will play a substantial role in determining eventual mortality rates. 7 In one model of a nuclear detonation in Los Angeles, the potential number exposed to harmful radiation fell from 285,000 to 45,000 when people sheltered in even moderately protective buildings. 8 Immediate evacuation following release of radioactive material can result in increased exposure as well as hindering the ability of emergency responders to attend the scene. 9 Other behaviours, such as moving quickly away from windows following the flash of a detonation 10 assembling an emergency supply kit ahead of time 11, 12 and (for those near an NPP) collecting potassium iodide (KI) tablets to take in the event of a release 7 are also likely to reduce mortality rates. However, planners have often assumed that panic and lack of knowledge will prevent the public from following instructions on how to protect themselves. 13 Generic advice has been written about how to communicate health emergency risks with the public.
Recent guidelines emphasise, among other things, the need to consider social and cultural influences on risk perception, 14 the importance of understanding personal risk exposure 15 and media relations training for emergency responders. 16 Yet, whether the public are likely to engage in specific protective behaviours during situations likely to create fear is unknown. Whilst practical guidelines do exist 17 little attention has been paid in the literature on how best to communicate with the public about protecting oneself in a radiation event. While the likelihood of a major nuclear emergency remains low, the need to engage in protective behaviours rapidly means that if the public are to be educated about protective behaviour, this must happen before any incident occurs. But will the public attend to messages 18 , and what should they say in order to combat fatalism 12 whilst avoiding being considered unnecessarily alarmist? 13 To address these questions, in this systematic review we identify: 1) factors which predict behaviour in preparation for a nuclear incident;
2) factors which predict behaviour in the immediate aftermath of a nuclear incident;
3) preferences among members of the public for information designed to educate them about actions to take in the event of a nuclear incident. Keywords and MeSH terms were grouped into three categories: nuclear terms and events (e.g. "radiation", "Chernobyl"), radiological terms and events (e.g. "dirty bomb", "Litvinenko") and behavioural terms (e.g. "shelter", "evac*"). The full strategy is shown in the appendix. Searches were conducted up to 31 st May 2017. Titles and abstracts were downloaded using Endnote software if potentially relevant. We undertook detailed review of the full text of papers plausibly meeting our inclusion criteria.
Method

Inclusion criteria
We used five inclusion criteria. First, only studies which sampled the general public were included. We excluded studies if the population sampled had received occupational training in emergency response procedures.
Second, we included studies relating to actual or hypothetical incidents involving a radiation hazard in which the potential for physical harm was present.
Third, we included studies if they explored factors associated with behavioural response before a radiation incident occurred and/or in the immediate aftermath. Studies were also included if they assessed preferences relating to pre-event or post-event information provision.
Fourth, we included studies if they used self-report (such as questionnaire or interview) or objective methods (such as footfall data) to assess actual or intended behaviour. For information preferences, we included outcomes measured through self-report, objective indices or any related measure.
Fifth, due to resource constraints, we only included papers published in English.
Data extraction
Where possible, we extracted data from each study regarding design, type of incident, location, sample, what predictors or correlates of behaviour were studied and outcome assessment.
Risk of bias
We appraised the quality of included studies using Downs and Black's 19 checklist. 20, 21 This has been validated for assessment of both randomised and observational studies. Items assess:
reporting, external validity, internal validity and confounding. Items not relevant to studies included in this review were not assessed (e.g. blinding). Studies were scored out of twenty-two with a high score equating to high quality. A table of quality assessment scores is given in supplementary materials.
Procedure
LG conducted the literature search, application of inclusion criteria, data extraction and quality appraisal with RA and GJR providing consistency checks of a subset of results.
We grouped studies according to the predictors of behaviour that were assessed. Further subdivisions were based on whether incidents were nuclear or radiological, actual or hypothetical, and whether the study used a quantitative or qualitative approach. Differences in outcomes between studies relating to accidental nuclear facility radiation emergencies and deliberate detonation of nuclear or radiological devices are explicitly mentioned where these were apparent.
For quantitative studies we extracted effect sizes where possible, and used a narrative approach to their synthesis. We used meta-ethnography to synthesise qualitative studies. 22 This involves induction and interpretation of original data across a seven-step process allowing for building of a 'comparative understanding'. 23 This process allowed for identification of the clearest categorises within which outcomes are reported.
Results
Search results
We identified 9480 records by database searching. Following de-duplication, another 155 were identified from forward-citation and reference list searching of included papers, the behavioural science database at Public Health England and the Emergency Planning College library.
Outcomes from four studies were reported across multiple papers. [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] Therefore, while the total number of papers included was 41, the total number of studies included was 31.
Figure 1 -PRISMA flow diagram of study selection
Study characteristics Thirty-three papers reported outcomes of quantitative methods, three used qualitative methods, three used a mixed methods approach and two employed an experimental design.
Twenty-four studies were undertaken with US or Canadian populations and 11 with European populations. The remaining studies six were conducted in Japan and Australia.
Nineteen articles (based on 13 studies) presented data on behavioural responses to real emergencies (including the Fukushima and Three Mile Island leaks) or events such as mass distribution of iodine prophylaxis, while 23 concerned hypothetical situations. See tables 1-3.
Quality Assessment
Other than two papers, those using qualitative methods tended to score poorly for methodological robustness, with quantitative studies receiving a mixed range of scores. Studies generally scored poorly for adequate adjustment for confounding variables, quality of reporting, description of the distribution of principal confounders, and estimates of random variability. A number of studies using quantitative methods failed to report probability values. Studies scored particularly highly for the clarity of study aims and findings, and for selecting participants from the same population.
Predictors of behaviour in preparation for a radiation emergency
16 studies reported factors associated with preparatory behaviour (see Table 4 for details).
Information seeking
One high quality survey 34 identified several cognitive factors associated with information seeking about nuclear emergencies, specifically the perceived probability and likely personal impact of an incident, one's perceived ability to cope, and worry. Perceptions of government or front-line preparedness were not associated with information seeking. In a study of people in the vicinity of Three Mile Island, information seekers were found to be more highly educated but were not necessarily those reporting the most worry. 29
Preparedness
Individual aspects of preparedness behaviour (such as compiling a first aid kit or supplies) have been variously associated with being older, a resident of rural areas, having higher education, 35 and with the perceived probability of an incident, coping efficacy, perceived front-line preparedness, and worry. 34 Few preparedness actions were found in residents near a nuclear facility who believed the site to be safe, but that in an emergency there would be no time to evacuate. 36 Mixed evidence was found for predictors of evacuation and sheltering preparedness, with preparedness being associated with having children under 18, whilst barriers to preparedness included denial/unwillingness and feeling unable to plan for the unknown/fatalism. 37, 38 Collection and potential use of KI was explored solely in studies of nuclear facility leak preparedness measures. One study found only 5% of almost 80,000 people living within ten miles of three Michigan NPPs collected free iodine via a voucher system. Non-collectors had planned for a nuclear plant emergency to a lesser extent than collectors. Stated reasons for collection included preparedness (58%), safety (18%), the fact that it was free (14%), and because it was recommended (13%). Reasons for non-collection included lack of awareness (36%), not receiving a voucher (12%), being 'uninterested' (7%) and feeling it unnecessary (4%). 39 In an experiment, no difference was found between a standard nuclear safety leaflet and one supplemented with extra information about statelevel preparedness in terms of how frequently they were kept or read by households which received them. 40
Adherence to evacuation recommendations
Two studies of evacuation behaviour found pre-incident warnings of an impending nuclear attack would prompt 66% to leave, rising to 73% if warnings intensified such as via presidential message, 41 in contrast to 18%-19% for a radiological dispersal device (RDD) attack, rising to 24% if warned by a 'top local official'. 38 Significantly fewer would evacuate if they learnt an actual attack was in progress. 41
Predictors of behaviour immediately following a radiation emergency
23 studies tested factors associated with post-incident behaviour (see Table 5 for details).
Information seeking
Among British nationals living near Fukushima uncertainty about exposure to radiation or its hidden effects was found to cause distress and anxiety which were in-turn associated with heightened information-seeking behaviour. 42
Adherence to evacuation recommendations
The leak at Three Mile Island resulted in self-evacuation of 54% of the entire local population following an advisory that pregnant women and children should leave. 43 Self-evacuees were more likely than those who remained to have attained high school education and be parents. 31 The likelihood of evacuating decreased with age, increased with household size and a significant association existed between behaviour and behaviour of neighbours. Stated reasons for evacuating were having received the advisory to do so (68%), fear of harm (46%), confusion (41%) and anticipation of a broader evacuation order with associated problems such as traffic gridlock (8%). 43 Three lower quality studies noted situational danger (cited by 30% and 91%) or concerns around forced evacuation (14% to 76%). 32, 33, 44 Reasons for non-evacuation were low perception of danger, fear of looting, waiting for an order for the general public to evacuate and believing oneself to be at a safe distance. 32, 33, 43, 44 Receiving conflicting reports was cited as both a reason to, and not to evacuate. 44 Conflicting evidence exists as to whether close proximity to an NPP promotes or deters evacuation. [45] [46] [47] Two reasonably robust papers and a third less so found actual (from Fukushma 26 ) and anticipated 46 evacuees were more likely to be families with children under 19 and internet users. 25 Similar findings have been reported in studies assessing intended evacuation in hypothetical scenarios involving deliberate attacks. Here, factors promoting anticipated evacuation have included: official announcements, news coverage, having children under 18 41 and perceived likelihood of harm. 48 A majority of parents (55%) reported they would attempt to collect children from school during an incident even if knowledgeable about school evacuation plans and their children's location. 41
Adherence to sheltering recommendations
Participants in three qualitative studies regarding radiation attacks (two of high quality and concerning RDD detonation) found sheltering recommendations counterintuitive, reducing their likelihood of adherence. 49-51 Trust in information source, perception and knowledge of the issue, checking information with trusted others (such as family and friends), family needs 51 and receiving a leaflet which included decontamination information 50 tended to increase adherence. A fourth study noted reduced adherence to sheltering in ethnic minority groups following a deliberate attack due to a desire to gather the family together before attempting to evacuate. 52 Studies using quantitative methods found 8% within 50 miles of an NPP 53 , 23% within 20km 54 and 33% in the US capital region 45 were unlikely to comply with sheltering instructions in a nuclear emergency; 11% 55 to 15 . 5% 37 in an RDD incident. Six studies, 36-38,53-55 three of high quality, found prioritising collection or checking on children or other family members was a primary reason for nonadherence in both nuclear accident and deliberate attack scenarios. Anticipated adherence would increase if people were able to communicate with, or know that loved ones were safe 55 or if they believed that food and water would be delivered 37, 38 in scenarios involving a deliberate attack. Further reasons for non-adherence with sheltering advice in both scenario types were low confidence or trust in community or government preparedness planning, feeling safer elsewhere, and to get supplies. 45, 53, 55 Two studies of RDD detonation response 37,55 found adherence with sheltering recommendations was predicted by community attachment, being over 65 and trusting the information source. Adherence with sheltering-at-work was 39% 37 and was higher in those aware of their building's sheltering arrangements or those confident in their community's ability to manage an RDD attack. 38
Preferences for information in the event of a radiation incident
26 studies examined information preferences (see Table 6 for details).
Information seeking
Choice of information source Two studies explored preferred pre-incident information sources, finding leaflets to be preferred by 62% of residents within 3km of an NPP 36 and that residents of the US capitol region preferred local television and radio (25% and 21% respectively), general internet searching (28%) and family/friends (24%/21%) for RDD information. 38 Two high quality focus group studies found preferred information sources during a nuclear attack would be the media (television/radio), internet, national level experts, word of mouth, emergency broadcast systems and local authorities, 52 while young males would also seek out their peers. 51 Seven further studies explored sources during a radiation emergency using quantitative methods; high quality reports found friends or family, first responders, 12 local or national media 56 and internet news/government websites 37 were preferred. These findings are supported by four less robust surveys. 24, 53, 57, 58 In an RDD emergency television network news and news or government websites were preferred; while social media, healthcare providers and the CDC were preferred by fewer than 2%. 38 Pre-incident nuclear information was found to be confusing and unclear in two studies (focus groups 52 ; experimental design 40 ). For example, participants did not fully understand the terms, 'shelter-in-place' and 'plume'. Low-literacy participants given literacy aided materials reported increased ability to carry out instructions. 59 An intervention leaflet was preferred to an existing nuclear safety leaflet due to greater ease of understanding, being more informative, offering a pin-up summary, and using preferred pictures and layout. 40 Studies using focus groups and RDD scenarios found leaflet length, density and complexity, lack of illustrations, accessibility for disabilities 60 and recommendations without explanation 50 to be criticisms, whilst a live voice delivering messages was preferred to a recording during an incident. 49 Preferences for information content Pre-incident, 77% of the US public expressed interest in knowing government and community RDD response plans 55 whilst 77% of participants presented with a scenario in which radiological materials were found in possession of terrorists would seek healthrelated information. 60 Following the incident at Three Mile Island, 43 some (number not reported) sought information on impact, whilst British nationals in Japan made requests for more information, consistency, clarity and regular updates during the Fukushima disaster. 42 In a hypothetical nuclear emergency, guidance on countermeasures and food safety would be sought by 86% of Italian respondents. 58 One focus group study using a hypothetical RDD emergency found desired information to include protective actions, water/food contamination, actions of authorities and requests for behavioural recommendations according to how close someone was to the site of the incident. 50
Perceived credibility of information source
Multiple studies explored trust and credibility. Their results varied: UK non-governmental sources, 60 scientists (also rated most competent alongside authorities 61 ) and the US President 38 all tended to be rated as most trustworthy, followed by local public health departments 53 and national news/media. 37, 57 Least trusted were US national media and local authorities, 38,51 nuclear industry, 61 local religious leaders and government. 37, 57 In general, increased trust was associated with consistency between messengers and messaging from authorities, such as expert medical advice 50 , whilst perceived reliability was associated with the use of basic terminology, 30 and increased confidence with recommended protective actions having been proven effective. 52 A series of studies demonstrated that acceptance of information during an incident was predicted by one's level of agent-specific knowledge, trust in the message source, 27, 62 whether the disaster is assumed to have low potential to cause personal harm and being from a directly affected population. 28 Regarding information preferences of different subgroups, Bass 63 found low literacy (mostly ethnic minority) survey respondents fell into three categories based on their perceptions of information sources and anticipated adherence: those most likely to trust that information is accurate and to adhere to sheltering instructions despite believing that authorities are unlikely to provide them with the same level of support as they do others; those least likely to adhere or prepare out of distrust in authorities and their information and; those likely to adhere to sheltering instructions given by local, but not national sources.
Discussion
How the public would behave immediately following a catastrophic nuclear or radiological incident is uncertain. For example in a hypothetical RDD or nuclear scenario most people in the US capital region report that they would shelter-at-home or in their workplace. 38,45 whereas actual nuclear incidents have seen self-evacuation to be common, particularly among those receiving information felt to be confusing or unclear. 40, 52 Given the likely link between behaviour and the overall health effects of a nuclear incident, encouraging protective behaviours should be a priority.
Recommendations are listed in box 1.
Encouragingly, rates of information seeking suggest a desire amongst the public to learn protective actions. 34, 50, 52, 55, 58, 60 This includes a wish to understand pragmatic issues, many of which could only be addressed after the specifics of an incident are understood. Some aspects could be addressed prior to any incident, however. In particular, studies of public communication around NPP emergencies display a desire to better understand risk (such as of the event happening) whilst regarding a deliberate attack there is a clear desire to understand threat (such as the likelihood of harm coming to those not directly affected). Immediately following the Fukushima emergency, for example, more than one-third of questions posed over the internet sought radiation-related knowledge. 64 Yet are the public receptive to messages about radiation or protective behaviour in advance of an incident occurring? Theories surrounding the uptake of protective behaviour in other contexts suggest that certain pre-requisites may be required before messages are attended to or acted on, including a degree of perceived threat and a perception that the recommended behaviour may be effective. 65 In the absence of such conditions, information campaigns may be ignored or quickly forgotten. 18 In contrast, public information campaigns can increase knowledge, 59,66 which may increase receptivity to future messages when a threat becomes more apparent. 27 Certainly, in the literature we have reviewed, perception of risk appears to be an important predictor of behaviour, influencing: acceptance of messages, 28 taking preparatory measures (fewer in those with high radiation risk perception), 36 selfevacuation 48 and information seeking. 60 Communicating with the public while perceptions of risk are low may result in messages being ignored. Nonetheless, if pre-incident communication is to be used, our results do offer guidance regarding what information should be given and how it should be conveyed.
Source and Method
A trend for greater preference for traditional media sources exists for pre-incident information relating to NPP emergency preparedness than for attack scenarios, whereas more would seek information using the internet if an attack were to occur. However, the shift towards public preparedness against Nonetheless the general point raised by many studies would seem to remain true: people will seek information from sources they trust.
Receiving messages from trusted sources was highlighted in multiple studies, though opinions inevitably differed as to who is trusted. A comparison of sources 61 found government authorities were viewed as most credible (and were a preferred pre-incident source 24,37,38,53,57,58 ), although scientists were considered more trustworthy and equally competent as nuclear industry. The nuclear industry, despite being perhaps best placed to provide information regarding radiation safety, appear least trusted to do so. If an incident were to occur, the public also want to hear from sources with knowledge particular to them and their area, such as local media, local authorities or friends and family, suggesting a primary concern in knowing how personally affected they might be as opposed to the national situation.
Given this heterogeneity, perhaps the best that can be recommended is the old adage of multiple sources 'speaking with one voice'; having messages endorsed by multiple experts and agencies increases the chances of them being accepted 17 . In today's media climate this approach may be difficult to achieve. In many instances, the media actively seek out opposing views, 67 oftentimes subjective in nature, 68 which increases distrust of scientists and public health messages. 69 The finding that scientists appearing on national media lost credibility 60 highlights this point. It is perhaps unrealistic to expect one-voice communication to occur in an incident of this nature. The 2018 false alert of a nuclear attack in Hawaii is an example in which the authoritative voice was one of many and was arguably lost amongst social media feeds. This perhaps supports the apparent need for corroboration of information from peers. 51 Ideally, different endorsements are needed for different groups. For example, one high quality study 51 conducted with low-income residents of urban areas found most trust in local media and a need to have an established community spokesperson endorse authority recommendations further.
Content and format
Two experiments were included in this review both of which found clarity and ease of understanding were commonly requested both pre-and during incident messaging. This is a pressing concern amongst low literacy individuals who may require decision aided materials which would improve knowledge of actions and intention to adhere to sheltering instructions as was the outcome of one experiment. 59 However, this was also expressed within the wider public. Consistency in messages within and across sources is also desirable and associated with adherence to recommendations. 32, 33, 51 Inevitably, substantially more information is desired immediately following an incident than preincident, relating to issues such as food and water contamination, 58 actions of authorities and recommendations specific to where the individual is at that time, 50 as well as regarding the likelihood of further attacks. 60 The other experiment, a study of the effectiveness of a pre-incident communications leaflet 40 found advisories best recalled were arguably those with the most personal impact on the recipient, such as not collecting children from school and not using mobile phones. Instructions less well recalled (e.g.
to take KI if told to) are perhaps considered out-of-the-ordinary in terms of activities undertaken regularly or are ones not previously considered. Other criticisms of leaflets such as excessive length, density and complexity, lack of illustrations, accessibility issues for disabilities and recommendations backed up by facts without explanations represent potential barriers to the reception of information; however, whilst recall of certain advisories increased with a developed leaflet, no significant difference in intended adherence or understanding was found.
Several instances of apparent fatalism hindering the likely uptake of messages were found. For example, many individuals living close to an NPP felt that preparing for an emergency was not worthwhile since they would not have time to evacuate 36 and were disinterested in collecting free KI. 39 To encourage preparedness, pre-incident communications should provide information regarding the efficacy of the suggested behaviour. This may require a degree of education about the nature of radiation, the mechanism underlying the benefits of KI, conditions under which evacuation or sheltering would be appropriate and how people might be informed as to which action is recommended depending on the nature of the incident.
Greater detail in communications regarding the processes that exposed survivors might experience, such as an explanation of decontamination procedures, 50 may increase adherence. Adherence to recommendations will likely increase if the public can be reassured, for example, that food and water can be delivered to them whilst sheltering 47 or that they can be evacuated to somewhere where support will be offered. This extends to psychological support. 36 In addition to neighbours and friends influencing behavioural responses, with individuals looking to the actions of others to inform their own decisions, family needs are fundamental in shaping actions,
with several studies 33,38,41,43,48,50,54,55 identifying a desire to collect children from school and make contact with loved ones, even at the expense of increasing exposure to radioactive material. This latter phenomenon has been observed in previous non-radiological incidents 18 and must be addressed in preincident communications, perhaps by providing parents with information as to what the responsibility of schools are in protecting children.
Gaps in understanding
A number of gaps emerged from the literature that appear central to our understanding of effective public communication in the pre-incident phase. One gap relates to use of social media in radiation emergency communications. Social media is likely used by a large number who would choose the internet as a source and method of information gathering following an incident. It is unclear at this stage to what extent social media could be used to disseminate and promote pre-incident public education for radiological and nuclear emergencies. Secondly, more data is needed on how different information sources can foster trust in the public. Trust is central to whether information is accepted and recommended actions adhered to. Previous studies have largely quantified levels of trust in sources and few have explored the facilitation of trust, or distrust.
The longer-term impact of any information campaign is a third key knowledge gap. Hopefully, any pre-event messages that are disseminated will never need to be used. However, maintaining knowledge over time is important. To date, studies have generally only focused on the immediate impact of messages. Whether messages about high impact events which later do not come to pass have a wider, detrimental, effect on the credibility of future messages on related issues is also unknown. 70 This presents a challenge for communicators, and the frequency with which messages need to be repeated and reinforced is an area worthy of further investigation.
Limitations
Relatively few studies included in this review provided evidence about actual observed behaviour.
Those that were available often suffered from methodological deficits, possibly related to their reactive nature and the need to begin research promptly during the immediate period following an emergency. It was therefore necessary to include anticipated behavioural responses from hypothetical scenarios in drawing our conclusions. Arguably, studies using hypothetical scenarios are flawed: how can members of the public be expected to know how they would react or what information they would want in such extreme circumstances? A possible counter to this is that many studies used well researched and realistic injects in their studies; yet the difference between viewing a news report of a real attack taking place versus watching it from the comfort of a focus group is inescapable. In exploring anticipated adherence and information needs in a radiation emergency, hypothetical studies make up the majority of research in this area. Though the methodological quality of hypothetical scenario studies in this review was stronger than that of studies from actual events in most instances, this limitation must be considered in our interpretation of results.
One observation of study quality was the absence of effect sizes reported for some studies using quantitative methods. This made comparison between study outcomes difficult, allowing us to judge only whether findings were generally in the same direction. Future research in this area should address this in order to ensure direct comparison can be made between populations.
The literature would also benefit from variation in the populations studied: few studies explored information preferences across populations with potentially differing information needs. In addition, few studies used mixed methods; meaning information gathered regarding potential predictors of behaviour (such as using focus groups) were not explored further in terms of strength of predictors.
Finally, available resources meant that we could only include studies published in English in our review. There are likely to be studies conducted in other countries that have experienced nuclear incidents or a nuclear threat (e.g. Japan and South Korea) where efforts to prepare the public have been ongoing for some time. A future review should seek to identify studies published in languages other than English, focusing particularly on countries that have been observed to implement preincident public information campaigns.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the decision to use pre-incident communication regarding protective behaviours for use in such a high impact, low likelihood event is likely to be a political one. Our review highlights a number of factors that could increase engagement with key messages, and promote the uptake of protective behaviours and emergency interventions that will save lives in the unlikely event of a catastrophic radiation emergency. Without consideration of best practice in pre-incident public communication for radiation emergencies a catastrophic incident could become worse than we currently fear; it is essential that we plan for this.
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The authors listed above certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organisation with any financial or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials in this manuscript. to how individuals can find out which action is most suitable to them (such as based on their location to the emergency), and who they can expect to give this information • Information regarding recommended actions should clearly explain reasons why these might be advised, including the circumstance under which there might be a danger in nonadherence • Preferred methods of distribution are likely to differ: pre-incident information will benefit from being accessible in the public's own time such as leaflet, letter or website information, whereas information distributed during an incident are likely to involve a preference for internet communications • Information should seek to minimise uncertainty in the public by outlining frequently requested information including exposure effects (means of contamination; symptoms), protective actions to take and the length of time people may potentially be required to shelter • Pre-incident information should include links to further information including lowliteracy aided and preferred language materials • Information should specifically address the impact on families/children such as protective actions for parents/caregivers to take, actions to take if children are at school in an incident and health effects for children • Evidence supporting advisories should be provided (potentially making reference to past radiation events and to scientific evidence) but should be presented in clear, non-jargon language making clear that the actions outlined have been proven to offer protection and increase safety • Potential food and water contamination should be addressed including what could safely be consumed • Actions that would be taken by authorities, particularly regarding public protection, in the event of a radiation emergency should be addressed where possible • Combined sources may be used in presenting information: for example, messages presented by recognised government officials should cite health protection agencies and/or nuclear industry sources • Where multiple sources make information available, a consistent message must be relayed • Basic terminology should be used in all communications • Information presented in the event of a radiation emergency should echo information presented pre-incident with reassurance given that if pre-incident communications were not received or have been forgotten that there are ways of accessing them still if opportunity allows) Table 4 
. Predictors of behaviour in preparation for a radiation emergency (significant effects in bold)
Risk of bias score Information Seeking : perceived probability (β=0 . 16, t=4 . 88, p<0 . 001), perceived personal impact (β=0 . 08, t=1 . 93, p=0 . 05), coping efficacy (β=0 . 10, t=3 . 43, p<0 . 001), worry  (adjusted R2=0 . 05, F(3, 1096)=21 . 80, p<0 . 001, with β=0 . 19, t=6 . 22, p<0 . 001); negatively associated with perceived seriousness (β=-0 . 08, t=−2 . 05, p<0 . 05) ; perceived government or front-line preparedness not significant 29. (QN) Information seekers near TMI were more highly educated and male but not necessarily those reporting most worry (effect not reported) (QN) ~85% had 3-day supply of non-perishable food, 76% a way to cook without utilities; 65%a 3-day supply of drinking water; 67% prepared a first-aid kit, (among households with medication users) 63% had a 7-day supply 39. (QN) 5% collected free KI; voucher non-users reported not having planned for a NPP emergency to a greater extent (60%) than users (26%) x2=18 . 47, p< . 0001); reasons for (pre-incident) uptake of KI: be prepared (58%), safety (18%), free (14%), recommended (13%); reasons for non-use: not knowing about program (36%), 'don't know' (19%), didn't receive voucher (12%), 'not interested' (7%), felt KI unnecessary (4%) 38. (QN) 40% had some preparedness plans including respondents who experienced an event that caused them to stay at home or to evacuate, more highly educated, those with children <18, older respondents (effects not reported); differences regarding race, geographic location, income not significant; barriers to preparedness: denial/ unwillingness (22%), other priorities (17%), lack of time (15%), no reason (12%), cant plan for unknown/ fatalism (10%), 'don't know what to do' (9%), lack of money/ resources (3%) 37. (QN) 27% stored food for >10 days, 31% 6-10 days, 15% <6 days, 27% none; 21% water stored for >10 days, 17% 6-10 days, 21% <6 days, 41% none; ~0 . 4% reported no sheltering capacity; respondents with children, pet owners, those with strong community attachment, full-time workers, those aged 50-64 more likely to have a designated meeting place; education and income not predictors ; confidence in authorities not significant 28. (QN) Interaction of specific knowledge and trusting authorities predicted message acceptance in affected population (β =0 . 029, SE=0 . 009, p<0 . 01); specific knowledge not significant (joint effect of specific knowledge and disaster potential did predict acceptance in general population (β= . 13, SE=0 . 42, p<0 . 01); attitude toward science and technology marginally significant effect on acceptance in affected population (those with a more positive attitude less inclined to accept messages (β=-1 . 077, SE=0 . 402, p<0 . 05)); respondents believing NPP accident potentially disastrous accepted messages less than those assuming low disaster potential in general (β=− Table 6 .
(QN) Predictors
Preferences for information in the event of a radiation incident (significant effects in bold)
Risk of bias score Information Seeking , government websites (21%), news websites (21%), local TV news (25%), family (24%), friends (21%), local radio (21%); Preferred sources (during incident): television network news (80%), (internet: news/ government websites (49%), social media (<2%), healthcare provider or CDC (<2%)) 55. (QN) 77% 'moderately'/ 'extremely' interested in learning more about government/ community organisation plans for (pre-incident) RDD response 60. (QN) 77% would seek health-related information (pre-incident) about prevention, protection, symptoms and treatment, likelihood of further attacks (RDD emergency) 50. (QL) Desired information: factual, protective actions, water/food contamination, actions of authorities (during incident); Zone maps requested (w/ advice/behavioural recommendations) 37. (QN) Preferred sources (during incident): local TV news (68%), local radio (63%), national TV news (49%), internet news (26%), internet unspecified (22%), internet government site (16%), local newspapers (16%), family/ friends (16%), local police (10%), local fire dept. (6%), doctors/ healthcare providers (3%) 40. (Experiment) Reasons for preference of (pre-incident) intervention leaflet over existing NSIL: simpler/easier to understand, more informative, offered pin-up summary, preferred pictures, preferred layout; NSIL preferred for familiarity, preferred layout , preferred pictures   17   19  20  12  15  14   16  15  12  18  17  19   16  16  17 16 17 Perceived credibility of information source 52. (QL; QN) Concerns expressed that government will not distribute all information/lack of availability in different languages (pre-incident); recommended actions more credible if proven effective 51. (QL) Limited trust in national media (local media preferred), local authorities (president directives preferred) (during incident) 60. (QL) Information presented in media (during incident) viewed with suspicion; positive reaction non-governmental sources; 'Independent scientist' lost credibility as 'chosen by media' 50. (QL) Lack of consistency across messengers (during incident) increased confusion/ anxiety; leaflet recipients rated messages from authorities more credible 57. (QL) 33% rated media as a credible (pre-incident) source of information, 30% first responders, 16% academics/ scientists, 14% government 63. (QN) (pre-incident) Respondents fell into 3 categories: trust information, not response (32%: most likely to adhere), distrust information and response (18%: least likely to adhere/ 35   49  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  5  12   44  0  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  5 
